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MEDICINE AND SOCIETY 
Reproductive Rights and Access to Reproductive Services for Women with 
Disabilities 
Anita Silvers, PhD, Leslie Francis, JD, PhD, and Brittany Badesch 
 
Are women with disabilities owed equitable access to reproductive health services, 
including family planning, contraception, screening for sexually transmitted infections, 
maternal health services, and fertility services? Or are there circumstances in which 
disability is a reason to deny access to such services? Conversely, should women with 
certain disabilities have access to procedures such as caesarean section or sterilization? 
May these procedures be recommended just because a woman has a disability or 
imposed on her if she appears reluctant or unable to consent? 
 
Treating People with Disabilities: Equitable Access is Key 
Legal and professional answers to the questions posed above have been strongly in 
favor of equitable access to treatment and autonomous decision making for patients 
with disabilities. Physicians’ offices, clinics, hospitals, and other medical facilities are 
required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 to provide meaningful 
access to the services they provide for people with disabilities who meet essential 
eligibility requirements, with or without accommodations. These providers may also be 
covered by state antidiscrimination laws. 
Meaningful access is a legal standard that calls for a fact-specific inquiry into whether 
individuals with disabilities are afforded equitable opportunity to benefit from the 
provider’s services [1, 2]. The focus is on whether the individual’s disability has 
occasioned loss of equitable opportunity to receive the same quality of medical services, 
rather than the same resulting benefit, as that afforded to other people. A site that 
dispenses medical treatment would not meet this access standard if, for example, a 
speech-output version of the usual printed directions for taking medications was not 
provided to visually impaired patients, or if deaf patients could not participate with their 
physician in conversations about treatment choices for lack of an ASL interpreter. To use 
another illustration, inaccessible examination equipment continues to be a problem 
despite the ADA [3]. A common example is the absence of examination tables that lower 
to facilitate transferring from a wheelchair to the table, preventing wheelchair users 
from being properly examined. This subjects them to limited, substandard, 
noncomprehensive care [4]. As a general matter, data indicate that adults with 
disabilities, especially women, receive less access to needed health care even when 
controlling for variables such as socioeconomic status [5]. 
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Additionally, professional organizations such as the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) and the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
urge that access to medical care be available without discrimination [6-8]. As for 
sterilization, ACOG urges that disability is not a reason in itself for or against it and that 
any such decision must be made on a basis that preserves, as much as possible, the 
patient’s autonomy [7]. This guidance is not always followed. In this paper, we explore 
how reproductive medicine for women with disabilities may be unfairly obstructed by 
this kind of laxity in guarding against discrimination and by mistaken assumptions about 
disabled people. We also recommend how such discrimination may be avoided. 
 
Mistaken Assumptions about People with Disabilities 
Several general assumptions commonly are made—mistakenly—about people with 
disabilities. 
 
Assumptions about decision-making ability. One common mistake is to assume that a 
patient’s having a disability necessarily affects the person’s competence. Clinicians may 
dismiss the possibility of achieving informed consent when patients have intellectual or 
developmental disabilities, wrongly equating certain diagnoses with an inability to 
understand or communicate at the requisite level. Clinicians may be inexperienced in 
helping patients with disabilities understand complicated medical questions or unwilling 
to take the time to explain when patients have difficulties in communication. For 
example, they may neither realize that anyone’s decision-making ability is affected by 
both individual capacity and social context, nor be aware that, for patients with 
intellectual disabilities, assessment of abilities may be improved by acknowledging 
positive support from family or community relationships and social services [9-12]. 
 
As a result, people with disabilities may be inappropriately subjected to paternalistic 
judgment, including judgments about their very ability to consent to sex or reproduction 
[13]. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
Article 12 requires equal legal recognition of persons with disabilities. The CRPD 
guidance also recommends appropriate supports for persons with disabilities in 
exercising their legal capacities. In line with CRPD recommendations, many jurisdictions 
have been exploring methods for supported decision-making—that is, methods of 
deciding in which persons with intellectual or psychiatric disabilities work with others to 
determine and pursue their goals [14, 15]. ACOG goes further, stating that it is 
“essential” to obtain the assistance of professionals trained in communicating with 
people with intellectual disabilities when ascertaining capacity to provide informed 
consent for any surgical procedure [7]. 
 
Assumptions about sexual and reproductive interests. Disabled people too often are 
stereotyped as needing special protection, including measures that curtail their 
ambitions for intimate relationships and family life. It is inaccurate to assume that being 
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disabled means having no sexual or reproductive interests or being sexually inactive, 
celibate, or asexual. For example, the sexual interests of people with physical disabilities 
such as spina bifida or cerebral palsy may be underestimated based on false 
assumptions about their sexual capabilities [16, 17]. People with sensory disabilities 
such as blindness may be burdened by others’ false assumptions about their parenting 
abilities [18, 19]. And people with intellectual disabilities may be looked at merely as 
potential victims of sexual predation or exploitation, rather than as people with sexual 
interests or capabilities who need not only protection but also sex education and 
recognition of their agency [20]. 
 
Assumptions like these may be the reason that people with disabilities unjustly receive 
less access to medically indicated reproductive care than other people of similar age and 
sex. Too frequently, ordinary preventative services such as noninvasive birth control, pap 
smears for women who are sexually active, or mammography are not offered or are 
denied to women with various kinds of disabilities because they are wrongly supposed 
not to need them [21-23]. Mistaken assumptions about patients’ abilities to use these 
services also reduce access to care [24]. So may concerns that these patients may 
require lengthier visits—for example, to navigate narrow examination rooms crowded 
with furniture or access equipment designed with the assumption that all patients can 
stand—or lack of familiarity with how the disability may affect a physical, cognitive, or 
communicative component of the appointment [24]. 
 
Misjudging Women with Disabilities in the Context of Reproductive Health Care 
We now turn to assumptions that lead to misjudgments in reproductive care for women 
with disabilities. 
 
Assumptions about risks of pregnancy. First are exaggerated or misdirected concerns 
about the riskiness of pregnancy when a person with a disability is involved. It is not 
unusual for women whose disabilities do not affect their gynecological functions to have 
their pregnancies labeled high-risk and to be referred for unnecessary consultations or 
tests by an overanxious clinician [25, 26]. Caesarean sections and induction of labor may 
occur more frequently in women with disabilities, even in the absence of standard 
medical indications [25, 26]. An illustrative example is that of a pregnant triple amputee 
referred to genetic counseling although her impairment was not inherited. A 
perinatologist to whom she also was referred denied that her pregnancy was high-risk 
and warned her against being talked into a caesarean section just because her absence 
of limbs made other physicians nervous [27]. Clinicians should take care that 
assumptions about risks are not prompted or exaggerated by unwarranted 
generalizations or stereotypes. If risk is considered per patient, and it is determined that 
a pregnancy would be of significant physical risk to a particular woman because of her 
disability, she may also achieve lower-risk parenthood by being offered access to 
surrogacy [12]. 
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Assumptions about probability of treatment success. Clinicians should avoid conflating 
judgments that an intervention would be futile—for example, a determination that 
pregnancy is physiologically impossible because a patient lacks a uterus—with 
judgments that prognosis is poor (in which cases pregnancy would be physiologically 
possible, but unlikely). In cases deemed to have a low probability of pregnancy, some 
patients with disabilities, just like some patients without, may still wish to try to achieve 
pregnancy. According to the ASRM, treatment may be ethically provided in such cases if 
patients are fully informed about their prospects and clinics develop patient-centered, 
evidence-based policies about when they are willing to provide fertility services [28]. 
 
Beliefs about parenting ability. Much less clear, but not less frequent, are judgments about 
fitness to parent that motivate reluctance to provide fertility services. Mistaken 
assumptions about parenting ability may discourage referrals for fertility therapy [29, 
30]. People with disabilities who reproduce are sometimes condemned as posing risks to 
or imposing burdens on society. Women with disabilities who have experienced 
pregnancy frequently report being targeted by complaints about their selfishness, based 
on the assumption that their relatives will have to raise their children or that their 
children will become burdens to taxpayers [12, 27]. 
 
Despite increased understanding of heritability, disabled women may also be 
discouraged from pregnancy out of misplaced fear that their children will in turn have 
disabilities [27]. As legal history underlines, people with disabilities have been subject to 
forced sterilization for precisely these reasons [31, 32]. The US Supreme Court’s 1927 
decision in Buck v. Bell upheld involuntary sterilization on the grounds that it was 
necessary “to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the 
world if…society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind” 
[33]. This reasoning is both misleading, as many disabilities are not heritable, and 
profoundly biased, as it expresses the idea that the existence of disabled people impedes 
or otherwise harms everyone else. 
 
Whether withholding reproductive services from patients is discriminatory depends on 
the beliefs that prompt it: are all prospective parents vetted to discover whether they are 
likely to raise children safely and well—or has stereotyping made disability a trigger for 
withholding services? The ASRM opines that fertility programs may withhold services to 
prospective parents—but only on the basis of “well-substantiated judgments that those 
patients will be unable to provide minimally adequate or safe care for offspring” [34] The 
ASRM cautions clinicians to “pay special attention to treating equally persons with 
disabilities who request fertility services” [35] and notes that children thrive within a 
wide range of “parenting approaches or homes” [35]. Especially noteworthy is the ASRM 
stricture that scrutiny of potential parenting ability should not be applied to persons with 
disabilities unless applied to persons generally [6]. The ASRM is explicit that this 
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antidiscrimination provision applies to both potential parents with intellectual disabilities 
and mental illness and those with physical disabilities. 
 
This advice—to respond to patients with disabilities with respect—requires attention to 
individual differences, language and culture, counseling settings, stressors, and 
medications [7]. It may be generalized to all areas of medicine and to all disabilities as 
good guidance for acting ethically by avoiding discrimination. 
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